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If countries wish to protect legitimate and non-discriminatory public welfare regulation 
from investor-state claims, what options do they have? This Perspective highlights an 
innovative feature in the recent China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) that 
goes well beyond existing safeguards for protecting the regulatory autonomy of states by 
providing a mechanism for joint treaty party control. In doing so, ChAFTA evidences a 
new and controversial step in efforts to recalibrate interpretive authority between arbitral 
tribunals and the treaty parties acting collectively. 
 
Newer-style investment treaties often seek to protect countries’ regulatory autonomy by 
reaffirming the importance of public welfare regulation in the preamble, refining and 
clarifying core investment protections, and sometimes including general exceptions 
clauses. These approaches are useful but have limits. Preambular provisions are non-
binding. Substantive clauses are binding, but states may not wish to allow arbitral 
tribunals to second-guess the permissibility of sensitive public welfare measures. Even if 
respondent states ultimately prevail, they are likely to expend considerable resources in 
time and money in defending claims. 
 
Faced with these concerns, China and Australia broke new ground in ChAFTA by 
including a mechanism that protects public welfare measures through joint treaty party 
control. ChAFTA provides that “Measures of a Party that are non-discriminatory and for 
the legitimate public welfare objectives of public health, safety, the environment, public 
morals or public order shall not be the subject of a claim” by an investor.1 If an investor 
challenges a regulatory measure, the respondent state is permitted to issue a “public 
welfare notice” specifying why it believes that the measure falls within this exception. 
The arbitration proceedings are then suspended and a 90-day consultation period with the 
other treaty party is triggered.2  
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If the treaty parties agree that the challenged measure fits within the scope of the carve-
out, the decision is binding on any investor-state tribunal, and any decision or award 
issued by such a tribunal must be consistent with that decision.3 Because the mechanism 
is triggered at an early stage of the process—the respondent state has 30 days to issue a 
notice after receiving a request for consultations from an investor—it may prevent an 
investor-state tribunal from being established at all. If the treaty parties are not able to 
agree on whether or not the measure falls within the carve-out during the 90-day 
consultation period, the matter falls to the investor-state tribunal to determine. The 
tribunal is not permitted to draw any adverse inference from the non-issuance of a public 
welfare notice by the respondent or from the absence of any decision between the treaty 
parties as to whether the measure falls within the scope of the exception.4  
 
This ChAFTA mechanism represents a new step in a broader trend of states seeking to 
recalibrate the balance between investor protection and state sovereignty, and between 
the interpretive power of arbitral tribunals and treaty parties. Recent treaties evidence a 
rise in provisions that permit the treaty parties to provide an interpretation of the treaty 
that is binding on arbitral tribunals. The ChAFTA mechanism takes that a step further by 
allowing the treaty parties to reach an agreement on the application of their treaty that is 
binding on arbitral tribunals. This is consistent with the approach taken in some recent 
treaties with respect to joint treaty party control over matters relating to taxation and 
financial services, but the ChAFTA provision is considerably broader in scope.5  
 
By requiring a joint decision of the treaty parties, ChAFTA limits the ability of 
respondent states to abuse the mechanism, which would be a more significant risk if the 
clause were self-judging. However, some will object to the measure as repoliticizing 
investor-state disputes by leaving investors at the mercy of joint decisions of the treaty 
parties. The clause does not include references to the public welfare measures being 
necessary or proportionate. Time constraints mean that a joint agreement is only likely to 
be reached in relatively clear-cut cases. There is also a question of how the mechanism 
would work between unequal treaty parties: there is a risk that a stronger party might lean 
on a weaker party to reach an agreement that was not warranted; or a stronger party might 
ignore attempts by a weaker party to reach an agreement that was justified.  
 
Ultimately, whether the ChAFTA mechanism works well in practice will depend on how 
home states internalize their dual interests as capital exporters (who are interested in 
protecting their investors’ rights) and capital importers (who are interested in protecting 
legitimate regulatory autonomy). If they get this balance right, the mechanism could 
provide an innovative modality for states wishing to protect legitimate and non-
discriminatory public welfare measures through joint treaty control. If they get the 
balance wrong, however, the clause will engender controversy due to over-use or remain 
in obscurity due to under-use.  
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